Archive for the 'Cognitive Science' Category

Some Updates

Sunday, May 16th, 2010

I finally uploaded some papers that I have written since September. These are mainly coursework from my MSc — I especially recommend the one on brain oscillations.

  • Here is an extremely short history of depression and its treatment. It is my last essay for the MSc.
  • Cortical oscillations are currently a hot topic in cognitive neuroscience. What is their functional role? In this essay I discuss what is known about our brains’ “clocking mechanism” to date.
  • What problems may occur when an acoustic signal is translated into a stream of words? And how might the brain overcome these problems? This paper discusses possible strategies.
  • Here are my answers to some questions about neuroimiging methods and their application in cognitive neuroscience.
  • Here are the slides from a presentation on EEG & MEG experimental design and preprocessing I gave with Thomas Ditye at the FIL’s methods Seminar.
  • Is asymmetric baseline frontal alpha activity as measured by EEG related to, or even predictive of, exercise addiction? Here is a critical review of Gapin, Etnier and Tucker’s recent study.
  • In 1972, Tulving described our knowledge about words, about their referents and meanings, and about the relations among them as semantic memory. Here is an essay discussing different models of semantic memory and its neurological basis.
  • Here are my answers to three questions about lesion methods and how they are used in cognitive neuropsychology.
  • Here is a neuropsychological report about a patient seen at the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery in London.

Comments and feedback welcome. For more see the Papers & Files page.

The Big Question

Monday, March 16th, 2009

How do worlds build up inside our minds? – As an answer, I expect more than merely explaining how we visually perceive the scene in front of us, or reconstruct in front of our mind’s eye the object we are touching with our hands from the incoming tactile stimulation. My question is more complex.

Among the first things to find out, is, for sure, what it is that I call “world”. To give it a start, I might try describing it as “environments we experience”. When I go out, take my bike and ride to the grocery store, for instance, I do find myself within a world containing the house I live in, my family, the neighborhood I am riding through, the store I enter for shopping, so on and so forth. When I dream, I find myself in diverse situations, maybe on another planet or in another time. When I imagine future scenarios, vivid scenes are building up inside my head, I can watch them, manipulate them, act upon them. When I remember I recall—more or less accurately—past situations, past environments, and people I was in touch with around the time of memory. When I read a story about, say, wizards and witches, I can have them do magic, experience their joy and feel their pain. A similar thing holds for games and movies, though these worlds are not as much “inside my head” as the ones previously described (they are flickering on a screen instead). And, finally, worlds can be more abstracted away from our usual experience—e.g. if I try to solve a math problem and mentally rotate an n-dimensional sphere (not that I could).

All these are instances of what I take to be worlds; one thing special about the grocery shopping situation is this: we call it real. The major difference between the real world and other, so called imaginative, worlds is that it is thought of as a representation, an image, or a copy of the outer world, the environment we actually engage with. It perhaps deserves a special status in our minds since the real world is the one we all share. It is the one that can, contrary to all the others, be used as objective reference point (or at least we think so).

If we take the outer (real) world for granted (which I assume we should—but that discussion belongs elsewhere) then the question of how it makes its way inside our heads might be answered by investigating our perceptual apparatus. But, as already noted above, this is insufficient. What about all the other worlds? How do they come about? And, perhaps even more importantly, what distinguishes them—despite from having no currently externally present reference—from the mental copy of the real world? Is it even possible to make this distinction?

Related to these, further questions need to be considered. Among the most urgent ones are (1) What does such a world consist in? Can we talk about “images” or “representations” being “neurally coded” in brain tissue? If so, what makes our brains produce an imaginative world of trolls and wizards as opposed to one of dragons and unicorns? and (2) Once it is there, how does such a world change? How can I act within it? Why do things, say, move? This sort of change or manipulation of worlds might be what is commonly referred to as thinking. One might then ask further, are there, perhaps, necessary and sufficient conditions for thought? One difficulty is, however, to distinguish a merely observatory thought (e.g., seeing a squirrel run away or recalling the look of a person’s face) from one in which we actively engage with our environment (e.g., dreaming of climbing a rock). Both inevitably are cases of thought but only the latter obviously involves world-manipulation. Taking a closer look, I suspect, even cases of apparent observation will, after all, include some sort of manipulation.

Thus far, I have laid out some questions answering which—I hope—will be of help to eventually approach the big question. It is time then to ask who can provide answers. Scientist are researching in memory, visual processing, attention, conceptual schemes, empathy, the connection between mind and body, consciousness and a bunch of other phenomena. But how to put all this together? Will a philosophical, neuroscientific or psychological approach turn out most fertile? There is a lot more to be said here; for these paragraphs are only the gist of a giant puzzle.

Master’s Open Day

Friday, March 13th, 2009

Cognitive Science is a unique combination and integration of various disciplines focusing around the question of how humans perceive and think. The University of Osnabrück, Germany offers international undergraduate, graduate and PhD programs in Cognitive Science predominantly taught in English.

  • What drives my attention?
  • How can I remember?
  • Why do I have emotions?
  • How do we learn?
  • What is the role of language?
  • How do we reason and solve problems?
  • How are cognitive abilities realised in biological and artificial systems?
  • Can neuroscience answer all these questions?
  • What do neurons tell us? How is the brain structured?
  • Why can a system be an autonomous agent?
  • What are the philosophical implications?
  • Is cognition extended or brainbound?
  • What is the role of external world?
  • How do humans and computers interface?
  • What is intelligence?
  • What does it need to design an agent?
  • How can complex information be processed effectively?

If you ever asked yourself one (or several) of the above questions you might be interested in studying Cognitive Science.

This year, in addition to our study taster for the Bachelor’s program, we are pleased to announce a Master’s Open Day on June, 12th. This day will give prospective Master’s students the opportunity to get to know Osnabrück’s program, research opportunities at the Institute of Cognitive Science and their potential fellow students, teachers and supervisors.

Sound interesting? — Then go ahead and try it!
Click here for further information and registration.

Schnupperstudium Cognitive Science

Friday, March 13th, 2009

Im vergangenen Sommer hat die Fachschaft des Studienganges Cognitive Science ein Schnupperstudium angeboten. Das Interesse groß und die Resonanz überwältigend. Daher werden wir im kommenden Semester noch einmal ein solches Programm anbieten.

Das Schnupperstudium richtet sich primär an Schulabgänger, die in diesem Herbst ihr Studium beginnen möchten. Es wird vom 14. bis 17. Jnui auf dem Hochschulgelände Westerberg stattfinden.

Neben Vorlesungsbesuchen — in den Fächern Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, Action & Cognition, Introduction to Computational Lingustics und Introduction to Artifical Intelligence — stehen eine Einführung in den Aufbau des Studiums und die Präsentation aktueller Forschung des Institus für Kognitionswissenschaften auf dem Programm. Außerdem wird es die Möglichkeit geben, das Instituskolloquium zu besuchen und an Experimenten teilzunehmen.

Ziel unserer Veranstaltung ist es, den Studieninteressierten einen möglichst authentischen Einblick in das zu geben, was sie im Bachelor-Studiengang Cognitive Science erwarten wird. Uns ist wichitg, dass sie bei ihrer Studienwahl eine wohl informierte Entscheidung treffen, die auf mehr basiert als einem Wikipedia-Eintrag.

Weitere Informationen gibt’s hier.

Mechanisms & Downward Causation

Thursday, February 19th, 2009


“Experiences Aren’t Like Bottles”

Sunday, July 13th, 2008

This term, I attended a course entitled “Existential Feelings” where we read Matthew Ratcliffe’s manuscript of “Feelings of Being”. In this book, Matthew introduces a new notion, “existential feelings”, which refers to the background structure that determines how one finds oneself in the world.

Existential feelings are not an entity but rather a relation—a relation between the subject and the world surrounding it. Matthew describes these feelings, these relations, as—in essence—something bodily: the body is the object through which we can pick them up. When we, as situated agents, engage with the outer world, we perceive a space of different possibilities. The sense of these “possibilities out there” is what Matthew generally describes as feelings.

Those feelings that set up the context in which things matter, that constitute our sense of reality (our ability to distinguish real from non-real), are existential feelings. They are difficult to reflect upon since we usually take them for granted and cannot have any experience without them.

However, there are situations in which we can recognize existential feelings: they become apparent whenever our “being in the world” is transformed, i.e. when they are heavily changed.
To get the flavor, just think of finally feeling at home again when returning from a very long journey or literally loosing balance when a beloved person has died. Even more obvious are altered existential feelings in severe cases of depression: patients feel disconnected form the world, nothing appears real to them anymore, and everything is drained from meaning. There are no subjectively significant possibilities left to these patients. Their sense of being in the wolrd is diminished, the “background of belonging” has changed, is partly missing.

Once I was familiar with this idea, I recognized that I had acquired a new vocabulary to talk about what is going on and how things feel. It allows me to grasp more accurately the differences between writing at a desk and reading in the sun. Further, I realized that an experience as such can never be isolated. It is tied up with the person and the situation she is engaged with—it is fundamentally different from whatsoever object.

Of course, the mere term “existential feelings” does not introduce anything new into the phenomenological world. Nor does Matthew Ratcliffe offer a precise definition of what exactly they are supposed to be.
Nevertheless, I think, it is quite a plausible assumption to start with that there is something in the background, something that shapes all our experiences.

Das Denk-Ding

Monday, June 23rd, 2008

Etwas geht vor in unseren Köpfen; geheimnisvolle Prozesse, die Menschen seit Jahrhunderten beschäftigen. Doch das einzige, das wir bisher unter unserer Schädeldecke ausmachen konnten, ist ein in sich verwundenes, helles, stark durchblutetes Etwas.
In einer Dokumentation stieß ich kürzlich auf die folgende Beschreibung:

Das menschliche Gehirn kombiniert die Optik einer aufgeblasenen Walnuss mit der Konsistenz eines weich gekochten Eis.
Doch nichts im ganzen Universum ist so kompliziert wie dieser glibbrige Klumpen aus über 100 Milliarden Nervenzellen.

— Irgendwie treffend.